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READY OR NOT, HERE COMES DR-CAFTA
I. INTRODUCTION

The Dominican Republic-Central America Free Trade Agreement (DRCAFTA)-a free trade agreement between the United States, Costa Rica, El
Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and the Dominican Republic that
entered into effect in January of 2006-has been simultaneously hailed as an
opportunity to improve the economies and labor conditions of Central
American countries and criticized as perpetuating a deeply flawed and
inadequate labor situation. The extremely narrow margin by which Congress
ratified DR-CAFTA in July of 2005, after much heated debate, political armtwisting, and a flurry of lobbying efforts by a wide variety of industry and
labor interests, shows the extent of the controversy behind this agreement.2
In light ofthe similarities between the DR-CAFTA and the North American
Agreement on Labor Cooperation (NAALC), the labor side agreement to the
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) entered into by the United
States, Canada, and Mexico in 1994', especially with regard to "enforce-yourown-laws" labor provisions, it will be useful to compare Mexico's labor laws
to those of the signatories of DR-CAFTA. This comparison will help to
determine whether the situations of El Salvador, Guatemala, and by extension
the other DR-CAFTA countries are sufficiently similar to Mexico's to make
the DR-CAFTA an acceptable fit, or whether the current Central American
labor environment is so different as to warrant a more hands-on free trade
agreement. In order to understand the feasibility of DR-CAFTA's labor-trade
linkage in Central America, this Note will compare the existing right of
association laws (defined as the rights to organize, bargain collectively, and
strike) of two of the signatories of DR-CAFTA--Guatemala and El
Salvador-with those of Mexico. Realizing that statutory law is largely
meaningless without a framework of respect for lawful rights and without a
l Central America-Dominican Republic-United States Free Trade Agreement, Aug. 5,2004,
119 Stat. 462, availableat http://www.ustr.gov/Trade Agreements/Bilateral/CAFTA/CAFTADRFinalTexts/SectionIndex.html [hereinafter DR-CAFTA] (adopted by the United States
on July 29, 2005).
2 See Edmund L. Andrews, Pleas and Promises by G.O.P. as Trade Pact Wins by Two
Votes, N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 2005, at Al (noting the extremely close margin of DR-CAFTA's
passage and the last-minute political dealing that won the votes); Edmund L. Andrews, Small
Trade PactBecomes a Big PoliticalDeal, N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 2005, at Cl (detailing the
extensive negotiations and high-pressure tactics used to obtain the necessary votes for DRCAFTA's passage).
' North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289
(1993) (entering into force on January 1, 1994).
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legitimate system of enforcement, the Note will also examine the context in
which these laws are enforced, including the extent of government support,
safeguards, and corruption.
It is my thesis that, while the DR-CAFTA presents a regulatory scheme
very similar to the NAALC, the current statutory structures and rule-of-law
situations in El Salvador and Guatemala are weaker than those in Mexico with
regard to labor rights. These soft labor enforcement provisions and
accompanying strong economic pressures have not been beneficial to Mexico's
labor rights situation and are very likely to harm El Salvador and Guatemala's
weaker labor climates.
Part II of this Note will introduce the background of the labor-trade link, a
controversial area in which the United States has been a leader, and will sketch
out the contours of the presidential fast-track authority, which has allowed the
President to pursue an expansive policy of free trade agreements. Part II will
also compare the labor provisions of the NAALC and the DR-CAFTA. Part
III will examine the respective substantive statutory law of Mexico,
Guatemala, and El Salvador relevant to the rights to organize, bargain
collectively, and strike. Part IV will look at the actual rule of law in these
countries, including enforcement, corruption, intimidation, and impunity
problems. Part V will compare and contrast Guatemala and El Salvador with
Mexico in terms of the aggregate effect of both the statutory and rule-of-law
labor situations. The Note argues that the Central American countries' labor
situation is weaker than that of Mexico, and consequently, these countries are
worse equipped to deal with the pressures of the DR-CAFTA than Mexico was
with the NAFTA and the NAALC.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE LABOR-TRADE CONNECTION

A. InternationalApproaches to Labor-TradePolicy: The ILO and WTO
The labor-trade linkage reflected in the DR-CAFTA is nothing new. The
first calls for international labor legislation as a way of leveling the
competitive field came in the early 1800s, but they never resulted in any kind
of substantive legislation.4 The International Labor Organization (ILO) was
founded in 1919' in large part to address concerns about the effect of differing

' Edward E. Potter, The Growing Significance of InternationalLabor Standardson the

GlobalEconomy, 28 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REv. 243, 244 (2005).
' Michael J. Trebilcock & Robert Howse, Trade Policy andLabor Standards, 14 MINN. J.
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labor conditions on the comparative advantage of countries with regard to
international trade.6 On the other side of the debate, the Generalized
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), and its successor, the World Trade
Organization (WTO), primarily have viewed their role as establishing rules
prohibiting what are viewed as unfair trade practices. The WTO has tended
to treat labor standards as a laudable human rights issue appropriate for the
ILO, not as a fairness issue relevant to market competition on an international
scale.7 Although the WTO's 1996 Singapore Declaration expressed support
for the ILO's work in promoting internationally recognized core labor
standards, it also denounced "the use of labour standards for protectionist
purposes" to strip away developing countries' comparative advantage.8 The
WTO has repeatedly made clear its refusal to include labor issues in trade
discussions.9
Like other international human rights organizations, the ILO promulgates
standards that are only binding on member states through ratification.° These
standards are enforced by investigation and reporting by the ILO, but are
merely "soft" instruments that depend primarily on member ratification and
public embarrassment to work." The ILO approach emphasizes "sunshine"
(technical assistance and publicity) instead of trade sanctions to encourage
countries to further workers' rights.' 2
In 1998, the ILO laid out a declaration of four core labor rights: "(a)
freedom of association and the effective recognition of the right to collective
bargaining; (b) the elimination of all forms of forced or compulsory labour, (c)
the effective abolition of child labour, and (d) the elimination ofdiscrimination
in respect of employment and occupation.' ' 3 These four principles apply to all
members, regardless of whether or not they have ratified the relevant
GLOBAL TRADE 261, 262 (2005).
6 Potter, supra note 4, at 244.

Jonathan P. Hiatt & Deborah Greenfield, The Importance of CoreLabor Rights in World
Development, 26 MICH. J. INT'L L. 39, 47 (2005).
' Thomas J. Manley & Luis Lauredo, InternationalLabor Standards in Free Trade
Agreements of the Americas, 18 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 85, 91 (2004).
9 Id.at 91.
10 Trebilcock & Howse, supra note 5, at 262.
Id.

Potter, supra note 4, at 250.
"3International Labour Organization, Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at
Work, in 2 International Labour Conference 86th Session Record of Proceedings 20 (1998),
12

availableat http://www.ilo.org/dyn/declaris/DECLARATIONWEB.Staticjump?varlanguage

=EN&varjpagename=DELCARATIONTEXT.
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conventions. Member nations commit to "seek to achieve the goals and
objectives" of, but are not legally bound by, the corresponding fundamental
conventions. 4 The United States, Mexico, Guatemala, and El Salvador are all
members of the ILO. 5
B. US. Trade-LaborPolicy in TradeAgreements
Although the United States has not ratified six of the ILO's eight core
conventions, 6 it has been at the forefront of the movement for the inclusion of
labor standards in trade agreements. 7 With the establishment of the
Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), under which individual developed
countries set requirements for developing countries' eligibility for preferential
tariff treatment, the United States explicitly included recognition of workers'
rights. 8 The 1984 U.S. GSP system, which conditioned duty-free access to the
U.S. market on countries "tak[ing] steps to afford internationally recognized
worker rights," allowed individuals and organizations to petition for
suspension of GSP benefits based on worker rights violations. 9 This system
continues through the present with countries being monitored until the GSP
provisions are replaced by a free trade agreement (FTA).2 °
The first U.S. FTA to condition trade on enforcement of labor standards
was the North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation (NAALC), a side
provision to the NAFTA. Originally negotiated as an afterthought designed to
make NAFTA palatable to American labor interests, the NAALC has since
served as a model for subsequent U.S. FTAs.2' Since NAFTA, the United
14 Potter, supra note 4,

at 249.

'5 International Labour Organization, Alphabetical List of ILO Member Countries, http://
www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/relm/country.htm (last visited Mar. 18, 2007).
16 The United States ratified Convention 105 (the abolishment of forced labor) in 1991, and
Convention 182 (the prohibition of worst forms of child labor) in 1999. Developments in the
Law - Jobs and Borders:111. Legal Toolsfor Altering Labor ConditionsAbroad, 118 HARV. L.
REV. 2202, 2207 (2005).
'7 Trebilcock & Howse, supra note 5, at 274.

18 REGINA ABRAMI, WORKER RIGHTS AND GLOBAL TRADE: THE U.S.-CAMBODIA BILATERAL

TEXTILE TRADE AGREEMENT 4 (Harv. Bus. Sch. Publishing 2003).
19 Id.
20 See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL LABOR RIGHTS FUND (ILRF), PETITION TO REVIEW
GUATEMALA'S COUNTRY ELIGIBILITY UNDER THE GENERALIZED SYSTEM OF PREFERENCES (GSP)
FOR VIOLATION OF INTERNATIONALLY RECOGNIZED WORKERS' RIGHTS (2004), available at

http://www.laborrights.org/projects/linklabor/GSP%20Guatemala%2012-04.pdf. Petitions on
other DR-CAFTA countries are also available at this site.
21 Marley S. Weiss, Two Steps Forward,One Step Back - Or Vice Versa: Labor Rights
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States has negotiated comprehensive FTAs with Jordan, Chile, Singapore,
Australia, Morocco, and Cambodia.22
The similarity in the use of labor provisions in U.S. FTAs is no accident.
In 2002 Congress used the Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act
(BTPAA) to renew the "fast-track trade authority" that had lapsed during
President Clinton's term of office. 23 This legislation allows the president to
submit treaties for Congress' approval of the entire package, without the
possibility of amendment. 24 The BTPAA provides that a "principal negotiating
objective" of any FTA negotiated under the Trade Promotion Authority (TPA)
is "to strengthen the capacity of United States trading partners to promote
respect for core labor standards .... 25 These "core labor standards" include
26
the right of association and the right to organize and bargain collectively.
Although these rights use language similar to that of the ILO standards, they
are defined by U.S. trade laws (including GSP) instead of by the ILO. 27 Other
principle negotiating objectives include: effective enforcement of labor laws,
28
transparent dispute resolution procedures, and anti-corruption measures.
The trade-labor linkage so favored by the United States has been highly
controversial abroad. Developing countries have expressed concern that the
labor provisions will take away their ability to offer low cost labor, stripping
them of the one competitive advantage they have over the well-trained and
educated workforces of developed nations. 29 There is also resentment of what
is viewed as protectionism,30 a claim that has been strengthened by the crucial
role played by American labor unions in the inclusion of labor standards in
both the General System of Preferences and the Trade Promotion Authority.3
UnderFree Trade Agreementsfrom NAFTA, throughJordan, via Chile, to Latin America, and

Beyond, 37 U.S.F. L. REV. 689, 701-02 (2003).
22 Marisa Anne Pagnattaro, The "HelpingHand" in Trade Agreements: An Analysis of and
ProposalforLaborProvisionsin U.S. Free Trade Agreements, 16 FLA. J. INT'L L. 845 (2004);
ABRAMi, supra note 18, at 1.
23 Manley & Lauredo, supra note 8, at 92.
Id.
25 Trade Act of 2002, 19 U.S.C.A. § 3802(b)(1 1)(C) (2006).
24

The other "core labor standards" are: "(C) a prohibition on the use of any form of forced
or compulsory labor; (D) a minimum age for the employment of children; and (E) acceptable
conditions of work with respect to minimum wages, hours of work, and occupational safety and
health." Id. § 3813(6).
27 Potter, supra note 4, at 251.
" Trade Act of 2002 § 3802(b)(12), (b)(5), (b)(6).
29 Manley & Lauredo, supra note 8, at 93.
30 Id. at 93-94.
3' ABRAMI, supra note 18, at 4; Pagnattaro, supra note 22, at 854.
26
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Regardless of the United States' motives, the labor-trade linkage has become,
and is likely to remain, a central element of U.S. FTA negotiations.
C. DR-CAFTA: The Newest Manifestation of the NAALC Legacy
The DR-CAFTA continues this policy of connecting trade with labor
standards. The DR-CAFTA is very clearly modeled on the TPA authorizing
guidelines, using nearly identical language with respect to labor rights and
enforcement.3 2 Although the NAALC was drafted long before the 2002 TPA,
its provisions are nonetheless very similar to the DR-CAFTA language. The
DR-CAFTA labor chapter begins with a commitment to "internationally
recognized labor rights," which closely parallels the NAALC's "guiding
principles."33 The NAALC parties commit to promote, to the maximum extent,
eleven enumerated principles, including the freedom of association and
protection of the right to organize, the right to bargain collectively, and the
right to strike.34 Likewise, each DR-CAFTA party "shall strive to ensure" that
five enumerated rights, including the right of association and the rights to
organize and bargain collectively, are "recognized and protected by its law."35
1. Commitment to Enforce Domestic LaborLaws
Although both agreements include a list of rights for which the parties
commit some measure of support, the only enforceable measures come from
the parties' own domestic laws. The NAALC states that: "Each Party shall
promote compliance with and effectively enforce its labor law through
appropriate government action....,"3 6 Similarly, DR-CAFTA makes multiple
references to parties' rights to establish their own labor standards,37 while
providing that "[a] Party shall not fail to effectively enforce its labor
laws ....

38

32 Compare Trade Act of 2002 § 3802(b)(1 1)(A)-(B), and § 3813(6), with DR-CAFTA,

supranote 1, arts. 16.2, 16.8.
33 DR-CAFTA, supra note 1, art. 16.1(1)-(2); North American Agreement on Labor
Cooperation, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Sept. 14, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1499 (1993), availableat http://www.
naalc.org/english/agreement.shtml [hereinafter NAALC].
34 NAALC, supra note 33, art. 1(2), Annex 1(1)-(3).
3' DR-CAFTA, supra note 1, arts. 16.1(1), 16.8(a)-(b).
36 NAALC, supra note 33, art. 3 (emphasis added).
37 See, e.g., DR-CAFTA, supra note 1, art. 16.1(1)-(2).
31 Id. art. 16.2(1)(a) (emphasis added).
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Although both the NAALC and the DR-CAFTA emphasize the parties'
national sovereignty and free discretion to change their labor laws, they
include different qualifiers on this right.39 The NAALC states that domestic
laws must "provide for high labor standards" and that parties "shall continue
to strive to improve those standards in that light.' '4 The DR-CAFTA's
limitation is more extensive-a whole paragraph is devoted to the subject. The
parties commit to "strive to ensure" that their laws are not changed in a way
that "weakens or reduces adherence to the internationally recognized labor
rights referred to in [the Agreement] as an encouragement for trade ... or...
investment in its territory. ' Therefore, although neither agreement provides
an express prohibition against weakening labor protections, such action under
the DR-CAFTA would appear to at least present a presumption of impropriety,
a presumption that does not exist under the NAALC.
2. Dispute Resolution Procedureand Limitations
Both agreements also include nearly identical limitations on when parties
may be challenged through dispute resolution for failure to enforce their own
laws. In order for a party's enforcement of its laws to be challenged, the DRCAFTA requires that the violation be part of "a sustained or recurring course
of action or inaction, in a manner affecting trade between the Parties ....
The NAALC only allows claims to proceed to an arbitral panel where there is
an "alleged persistent pattern of failure" of a country to "effectively enforce
its [labor law]" in a manner that is "1. trade-related; and 2. covered by
mutually recognized labor laws. 4 3 The NAALC makes the rights to organize,
bargain collectively, and strike almost meaningless by withdrawing them from
the reach of even the most basic enforcement procedures. Ironically, the
majority of submissions to the NAALC dispute resolution bodies have

39

Id. art. 16.1(2); NAALC, supra note 33, art. 2.

40 NAALC, supra note 33, art. 2.
4' DR-CAFTA, supra note 1, art. 16.2(2). This provision is also a reflection of the TPA,
which provides that treaty negotiators should "seek provisions in trade agreements under which
parties ... strive to ensure that they do not weaken or reduce the protections afforded in
domestic ... labor laws as an encouragement for trade." Trade Act of 2002 § 3802(a)(7).
42 DR-CAFTA, supra note 1, art. 16.2(1)(a).
"3 NAALC, supra note 33, art. 29(1). Prior to the calling of an arbitral panel, parties must
go through consultations and bring the disputed matter before the Labor Council. See id. arts.
27-29 (laying out the dispute resolution procedure).
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concerned violations of the right of association.' This may partly explain
why, in the eleven years since the signing of the NAFTA and the NAALC, not
a single complaint has progressed past the initial consultation stage of the
NAALC's dispute resolution procedure.45 Instead, enforcement is limited to
matters related to "occupational safety and health, child labor or minimum
wage technical labor standards ... .,,46 The DR-CAFTA, in contrast, contains
no such limitations;" no doubt due to a provision of the 2002 TPA mandating
that principal negotiating objectives must be treated equally with regard to
dispute settlement and remedies.48 Both agreements preserve a party's right
to exercise discretion in "investigatory, prosecutorial, regulatory, and
compliance matters," allowing a party found to be in recurring violation of its
labor laws to escape sanctions by claiming that its action or inaction stems
from a "reasonable exercise of such discretion" or a "bona fide decision
regarding the allocation of resources., 49 Both agreements contain provisions
stating that judicial proceedings and final decisions are to be fair and impartial,
open to the public (except when the administration ofjustice prohibits it), and
subject to appeal by the parties.5 ° Decisions of domestic labor courts are not
subject to review under the dispute resolution process of the FTA agreement.5
In reality, the NAALC's enforcement structures have had an extremely
limited role in rectifying violations of the law or providing redress for

44 See COMMISSION FOR LABOR COOPERATION, REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES NATIONAL
ADVISORY COMMITTEE REVIEWING THE FIRST FOUR YEARS OF THE OPERATION OF THE NAALC,

Annex 3, § V(B) (1997), available at http://www.nalc.org/english/reviewannex3_5.shtml
[hereinafter U.S. ADVISORY REPORT] ("Virtually all submissions have focused on... freedom
of association, the right to bargain collectively, and the right to strike, which are precisely the
three labor rights for which the NAALC provides only NAO and Ministerial Consultations, that
is, voluntary persuasion rather than any more potent remedy.").
45 For further discussion of the reasons for this, see supra Part V.
' NAALC, supra note 33, arts. 27(1), 29. See also the definition of "technical labor
standards" in article 49 specifically omitting freedom of association and the rights to organize,
bargain collectively, and strike. Id. art. 49.
41 See generally DR-CAFTA, supra note 1, art. 20.1-.6.
48 Trade Act of 2002 § 3802(b)(12)(G). The DR-CAFTA does, however, exclude labor from
those violations for which trade benefits may be suspended, assessing a capped fine instead. DRCAFTA, supranote 1, art. 20.17. This seems to conflict with § 3802(b)(12)(G)(iii) of the Trade
Act of 2002, which provides for "the availability of equivalent remedies."
49 DR-CAFTA, supra note 1, art. 16.2(1)(b). Nearly identical provisions are found in
NAALC, supra note 33, art. 49.
o Compare NAALC, supra note 33, art. 5, with DR-CAFTA, supra note 1, art. 16.3.
l CompareNAALC, supranote 33, art. 5(8), with DR-CAFTA, supra note 32, art. 16.3(8).
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aggrieved workers.52 A review of the National Administrative Office's (NAO)
reports on submissions of worker complaints reveals an abundance of reports,
studies, consultations, and seminars, but no real action to oblige Mexico to
enforce its laws or directly address worker concerns.53 A 1997 report on the
NAALC corroborates this fact, noting that the scarcity of submissions under
the process is likely attributable to workers' disillusionment with the NAO's
ability to get any real results.54 DR-CAFTA's nearly identical dispute
resolution procedures" are unlikely to be any more effective.

52

Having engaged in an inquiry into illegal practice of an employer and into the
failure of the law to remedy, the NAO [National Administrative Office, the
entity designated to receive complaints of labor violations] provides the
employees no remedy.... The Reports [of the NAO on a specific complaint]
are, in fact, generally so limited that there is no focus on whether the domestic
labor laws of Mexico... might better promote the Labor Principles of [the
agreement], which are largely ignored.

COMMISSION FOR LABOR COOPERATION, REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT ADVISORY COMMITTEE
ON THE OPERATION AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THE NORTH AMERICAN AGREEMENT ON LABOR

COOPERATION, Annex I, § III(C)(2)-(4) (1997), available at http://www.naalc.org/english/
reviewannex 1_3.shtml [hereinafter INDEPENDENT ADVISORY REPORT].

13 See, e.g., id. § III(B) (summarizing action taken in response to various
U.S. NAO
submissions: No. 940003-public seminars on union registration, study by independent experts
on Mexico's union registration law, meetings between Mexican Labor Ministry and the
concerned parties, which did not result in rehiring of terminated unionists; No.
960 1-information exchange between the United States and Mexico on labor legislation in each
country, conference on the relationship between international treaties and constitutional
provisions); see also Commission for Labor Cooperation, Public Communications Submitted
to the United States National Administrative Office, http://www.naalc.org/english/summaryusa.
shtml (last visited Mar. 20, 2007) [hereinafter Public Communications] (summarizing action
taken in response to U.S. NAO submissions: No. 9702-seminar organized by Mexican
government to "promote the principles of freedom of association and the right to bargain
collectively," commitment by Mexican government to do this, and organization of a public
seminar on labor boards; No. 9901--creation of a bilateral working group on workplace health
and safety, exchange of information about different types of unions and association rights in the
U.S. and Mexico). Submission No. 9602 is an exception, in that after acceptance of the
submission by the U.S. NAO, the union was granted registration and dismissed workers were
granted rehearings. Id. See also INDEPENDENT ADVISORY REPORT, supra note 52, § III(C)(5)
("The recommendations of Ministerial Consultations and the consultation agreements have
focused on study, discussion and education, not corrective action.").
54 See INDEPENDENT ADVISORY REPORT, supra note 52, § III(C)(8) ("Another explanation
[for why the submission process has not been used more] is that it is viewed as a futile procedure
because it provides no remedy for those wronged. Nor has it resulted in any significant change
in the law, its enforcement, or the tribunals charged with enforcement.").
" Compare DR-CAFTA, supra note 1, art. 20.1-.19, with NAALC, supra note 33,
arts. 27-41 (laying out the dispute resolution process: consultations, meeting of the
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3. How Will a NAALC-Like Agreement Affect CentralAmerica?
Although there are some notable differences between the NAALC and the
DR-CAFTA, they both are clearly products of the same U.S. labor-trade FTA
policy. Both preserve national sovereignty while carefully acknowledging the
desirability of, and the (rather remote) possibility of sanctions for failure to
uphold, essential labor rights. This Note addresses a question that is crucial
for the workers of Central America: are El Salvador's and Guatemala's (and
by extension, the other DR-CAFTA countries') labor situations sufficiently
similar to Mexico's to warrant DR-CAFTA's NAALC-like treatment? Or are
Guatemala's and El Salvador's labor climates too deeply flawed for the "soft
touch" approach of the newest NAALC-modeled free trade agreements to
provide any protection to Central American workers? Given the similarity
between the labor and enforcement provisions of the NAALC and DRCAFTA, a comparison of Mexico's labor law situation to that of El Salvador
and Guatemala should be instructive as to the likely effects of DR-CAFTA on
the workers of these Central American countries.
III. STATUTORY LAW: SUPERFICIAL PROTECTION FOR WORKERS

This Part will examine and compare the substantive law relevant to the
right of association in Mexico, Guatemala, and El Salvador. The right of
association encompasses three more specific rights: the right to organize, the
right to engage in collective bargaining, and the right to strike. 6 The right to
organize covers government regulation of union formation, governance and
activities, and protection from employer retaliation.57 The right to engage in
collective bargaining deals with an employer's obligation to negotiate with
unionized workers and with penalties for employer noncompliance with
council/commission, arbitral panel, reports, review of compliance, and suspension of benefits).
56 These rights are defined by ILO Conventions No. 87 and 98, both of which have been
ratified by Guatemala. Mexico has ratified only No. 87; El Salvador has ratified neither. See
International Labour Organization, Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to
Organise Convention, Convention No. 87, July 9, 1948 (ratified by Guatemala February 13,
1952; ratified by Mexico April 1, 1950), available at http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/
convdispl.htm [hereinafter Convention 87]; International Labour Organization, Right to
Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, Convention No. 98, July 1, 1949 (ratified by
Guatemala February 13, 1952), availableat http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/convdispl.htm
[hereinafter Convention 98].
" See generallyConvention 87, supranote 56, arts. 1-7; Convention 98, supranote 56, arts.
1-2.
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worker agreements.5 8 The right to strike includes any restrictions on what
types of workers may strike and for what reasons.5 9 This section will explore
the extent to which each right is protected by each countries' respective labor
law.
A. Right to Organize
The laws of all three countries give workers the right to form unions for the
study, betterment, and defense of their common interests.6" Mexico and
Guatemala specifically state that unions may be formed without any previous
authorization; 6' El Salvador requires authorization from the Minister of Labor
prior to officially establishing a union.62 It is illegal in all three countries to
coerce someone to join or not join a union. 63 El Salvador's law in particular
contains broad protection against anyone doing things intended to dissolve the
union or submit it to employer control, discriminate against workers for union
" See generally International Labour Organization, Fundamentalprinciples and rights at
work: A labour law study- Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua,4-5
(2003), availableathttp://www.ilo.org/public/english/dialogue/download/cafta.pdf[hereinafter
ILO Labor Law Study].
" See generally id. at 5-6.
60 See Ley Federal del Trabajo [L.F.T.] [Federal Labor Law], as amended, arts. 356, 357,
360, Diario Oficial de la Federaci6n [D.O.], 1 de Abril de 1970 (Mex.), availableat http://www.
diputados.gob.mx/LeyesBiblio/pdf/125.pdf [hereinafter Mexico Labor Law]; Constituci6n
Politica de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos [Const.], as amended,art. 123 § XVI, Diario Oficial
de la Federaci6n [D.O.], 5 de Febrero de 1917 (Mex.), availableat http://www.disputodos.gob.
mx/LeyesBiblio/pdf/l.pdf [hereinafter Mexico Constitution]; Constituci6n Politica de la
Repfiblica de Guatemala [Const.], as amended,art. 102(r), Diario de Centro America [D.C.A.],
1985, availableathttp://www.guatemala.gob.gt/docs/constitucion-01 .pdf[hereinafter Guatemala
Constitution]; C6digo de Trabajo [Labor Code], asamended,art. 206, Diario de Centro America
[D.C.A.], 1995 (Guat.), availableat http://www.leylaboral.com/guatemala/Normasguatemala.
aspx?item= I &bd=41 [hereinafter Guatemala Labor Code]; Constituci6n Politica de la Repfiblica
de El Salvador [Const.], as amended, art. 47, Diario Oficial [D.O.], 16 de Diciembre de 1983
(El Sal.), available at http://www.asamblea.gob.sv/constitucion/indexl983.htm, http://pdba.
georgetown.edu/Constitutions/ElSal/ElSal83.html (including amendments through July 6, 2000)
[hereinafter El Salvador Constitution]; C6digo de Trabajo [Labor Code], art. 229, 31 de Julio
de 1972, Diario Oficial [D.O.] (El Sal.), availableat http://www.ilo.org/dyn/natlex/docs/WEBT
EXT/49592/65113/$95SLV0 1.htm, translatedin ILO Labor Law Study, supra note 58, at 13
[hereinafter El Salvador Labor Code].
61 See Mexico Labor Law, supra note 60, art. 357; Guatemala Constitution, supra note 60,
art. 102(r).
62 El Salvador Labor Code, supra note 60, art. 214.
63 See Mexico Labor Law, supra note 60, art. 358; Guatemala Labor Code, supra note 60,
art. 62(c); El Salvador Labor Code, supranote 60, arts. 205(a)-(b), 229(2)(Ch).
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activities (by contract wording or the type of work assigned), or force someone
to remain in a union.6
Mexican law allows for exclusion clauses in collective bargaining
agreements in the private sector,65 a practice specifically prohibited by the laws
of Guatemala and El Salvador.66 Industry-wide or multi-industry unions are
specifically allowed under Mexican law.67 Guatemala allows industry-wide
unions only when the union represents 50% plus one of the workers in the
industry.6"
1. Restrictions on Rights of Public Workers
El Salvador allows private workers to form unions, but prohibits all public
sector workers, except those who are part of "autonomous official institutions"
from organizing.6 9 Mexico also significantly limits the association rights of
public sector workers by only allowing one union-which must be a member
of the official Federation of Unions of Public Service Workers-at each
government agency.7" Public workers are prohibited from leaving a union once
they join7" and union officials may not be reelected.72
2. Union Formation,Membership, andRegistrationRequirements
Numerical prerequisites to union formation vary somewhat between
Mexico, Guatemala, and El Salvador. In Mexico and Guatemala there must be

6 See El Salvador Labor Code, supra note 60, arts. 205, 229, 277.
65 Mexico Labor Law, supra note 60, art. 395. Exclusion termination clauses state that the
employer may only hire members ofthe union; workers who leave or are expelled from the union
will be fired. Richard A. Posthuma et al., Labor andEmployment Laws in Mexico andthe U.S.:
An InternationalComparison,51 LAB. L.J. 95, 107 (2000). Exclusion clauses are prohibited in
public sector collective agreements. Ley Federal de los Trabajadores al Servicio del Estado
[L.F.T.S.E.] [Federal Law of Workers in the Service of the State], art. 76, Diario Oficial de la
Federaci6n [D.O.], 28 de Diciembre de 1963 (Mex.), availableat http://www.diputados.gob.mx/
LeyesBiblio/pdf/l 11 .pdf [hereinafter Mexico Public Labor Law].
6
Guatemala Labor Code, supranote 60, art. 53(c); El Salvador Labor Code, supra note 60,
art. 277.
67 Mexico Labor Law, supra note 60, art. 360.
68 Guatemala Labor Code, supra note 60, art. 215(e).
69 El Salvador Constitution, supra note 60, art. 47.
" Mexico Public Labor Law, supra note 65, arts. 68, 78.
71 Id. art.

72 Id. art.

69.
75.
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at least twenty workers in order to form a union;73 thirty-five in El Salvador.74
In Mexico, this requirement is protected somewhat from employer attempts to
sabotage the union's formation by providing that, for purposes of obtaining the
minimum number, workers who have been terminated in the period from thirty
days before presentation of the application for union registration until the date
when registration is granted may be included.75 Mexican and Salvadoran law
provide protection from infiltration by "trabajadoresde confianza" ("trusted
employees"-basically an employer's representatives).76 In Mexico, these
workers may not be members of an independent union,77 while El Salvador
only prohibits them from serving on the union executive board.78 Guatemalan
law provides no such explicit protection, although provisions giving unions
freedom to decide their admission procedures 79 may theoretically be used to
exclude employer representatives.
In order to gain legal recognition, unions in all three countries must follow
a similar process of registration with the relevant labor authority who (1)
checks the application for compliance with the law; (2) if necessary, returns
it to the union (allowing time to make corrections); (3) makes a decision on the
application within a statutorily mandated period of time; and (4) publishes
notice of the union's official approval.8 ° Mexican law specifically states that
the authorities may only deny the application if the union does not meet the
statutory requirements, 8 and Guatemalan law contains a similar provision
allowing disapproval only for "errors or uncorrectable defects. 8 2
Union rights to self-governance and to control admission of its members are
crucial to union identity and subsequent bargaining power. Under the law of
13 Mexico Labor Law, supra note 60, art. 364; Guatemala Labor Code, supra note 60, art.
216.
"' El Salvador Labor Code, supra note 60, art. 211.
71 Mexico Labor Law, supra note 60, art. 364.
76

Id. art. 363.

77 Id.
78

El Salvador Labor Code, supra note 60, art. 225.5.

79 Guatemala Labor Code, supra note 60, art. 221(f).

" However, this process is more complicated for Salvadoran unions since prior to applying
for legal recognition they must go through an authorization procedure. See supra text
accompanying note 62. Decisions on a union's application must be made: in Mexico, within
sixty-three days after presentation; in Guatemala, within forty-three days after submission of the
corrected application; in El Salvador, within thirty days after submission of the corrected
application. See Mexico Labor Law, supra note 60, arts. 365-66; Guatemala Labor Code, supra
note 60, art. 218(d)-(e); El Salvador Labor Code, supranote 60, art. 219.
SI Mexico Labor Law, supra note 60, art. 366.
82 Guatemala Labor Code, supra note 60, art. 218(d).
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all three countries, unions are given broad freedom to draft their own bylaws,
choose their leaders, make plans of action, and set conditions of membership
and reasons for expulsion and discipline of members, which must be included
in the bylaws.83 The only substantial limitation in this area is created by
Salvadoran law, which prohibits unions from engaging in political activities."
El Salvador's law also allows government access to mandatory annual audits
of the union's accounts 5 and requires unions to keep their funds in Salvadoran
banks, with the exception of an amount necessary for incidentals.86
Guatemalan law was recently amended to specifically eliminate such
government oversight of union finances.8 7 Although Mexican law does not
mandate financial disclosure, unions are required to submit reports of their
activities upon request by the labor authorities, to report changes in leadership
or bylaws, and to report entry and withdrawal of members at least every three
months. 88 All three countries require members of the union governing board
to be citizens of the respective country. 9 Guatemala limits the size of the
executive board and specifies that members must be workers in the business
or industry,9" while Mexico and El Salvador impose minimum age
restrictions. 9

83 Mexico Labor Law, supra note 60, arts. 359, 371; Guatemala Labor Code, supranote 60,

art. 221; El Salvador Labor Code, supranote 60, art. 217. Mexico allows unions to regulate the
substance of union meetings, decisions, and expulsion and discipline criteria. However, the
procedure by which these activities take place is governed by the Mexico Labor Law. Mexico
Labor Law, supra note 60, art. 371.
84 El Salvador Labor Code, supra note 60, art. 229(2).
85 Upon request by the government, unions are required to submit information "which under
their by-laws they are required to submit to their members at ordinary meetings" (which includes
the annual audit and a report of union activities). El Salvador Labor Code, supra note 60,
art. 226.6-.8.
86 El Salvador Labor Code, supra note 60, art. 226.5.
83 See Decreto No. 13-2001 (25 April 2001) art. 6, Diario de Centro America [D.C.A.], 25
de May de 2001 (Guat.) (amending Labor Code article 234 to eliminate provision requiring
annual audit of union accounts by the government).
88 Mexico Labor Law, supra note 60, art. 377.
89 Id. art. 372; Guatemala Constitution, supra note 60, art. 102(r); Guatemala Labor Code,
supra note 60, arts. 223(b), 220(d); El Salvador Labor Code, supra note 60, art. 225(1); El
Salvador Constitution, supra note 60, art. 47. Interestingly, El Salvador's Constitution defines
"Salvadoran by birth" as including nationals ofother Central American countries who show their
wish to be Salvadoran without giving up their original nationality. Id. art. 90.
90 Guatemala Labor Code, supra note 60, art. 223(b)-(c).
"' Mexico Labor Law, supra note 60, art. 372; El Salvador Labor Code, supra note 60,
art. 225(2).
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3. TerminationProtectionand Trade Union Immunity
In addition to the broad prohibitions against firing workers for belonging
to a union or coercing this choice contained in the laws of Mexico, El
Salvador, and Guatemala,92 El Salvador and Guatemala provide for "trade
union immunity." Workers protected by the immunity may not be dismissed
Such
without previous authorization from the judicial authorities.
union,
but
in
a
on
participation
be
based
may
not
authorization for dismissal
9
3
Under the laws of both
is only granted when warranted by "just cause."
countries, immunity applies to workers in the process of establishing a union94
and to union leaders. 95 El Salvador also provides protection for candidates for
union office (up to two for each post)96 and for a maximum of thirty-five
founding members of the union.9 7 Guatemalan law, meanwhile, protects "all
members of the provisional executive committee of a union in the process of
organization." 98 Importantly, El Salvador's law provides for temporary worker
suspension, which is unconstrained by the immunity provisions.99 Mexican
law contains no specific immunity provisions, although it does more broadly
address the issue by providing sanctions for employers who fire a worker
without just cause or for joining a union.l 0
Both Mexican and Guatemalan law contain provisions mandating
reinstatement of wrongfully fired workers, a crucial protection lacking in El
Salvador's law. Guatemalan law provides that wrongfully terminated workers
92 See Mexico Constitution, supra note 60, art. 123(A)(XXII); Guatemala Constitution,
supra note 60, art. 102(r); El Salvador Labor Code, supra note 60, art. 205(a).
13 See, e.g., Guatemala Labor Code, supra note 60, art. 223(d).
" In Guatemala, immunity extends from when workers notify the authorities that they are
forming a union until sixty days after official registration. Id. art. 209. In El Salvador, the
immunity lasts for a period of sixty days after the workers have notified the administrative
authority of their intent to form a union. El Salvador Labor Code, supra note 60, art. 248(1)(A).
9' In Guatemala, immunity exists for the duration ofthe officer's term and for twelve months
afterwards. Guatemala Labor Code, supranote 60, art. 223(d). El Salvador law protects leaders
during their candidacy, term of office, and for a year afterwards. El Salvador Labor Code, supra
note 60, art. 249; El Salvador Constitution, supranote 60, art. 47.
96 Immunity extends from thirty days before the election to one week afterwards (if not
elected). El Salvador Labor Code, supra note 60, art. 248(b).
" Immunity lasts for sixty days after the union's registration. Id. art. 214.
9' Immunity extends from the time that the members advise the authorities that they are
forming a union until twelve months after they cease to hold their positions. Guatemala Labor
Code, supranote 60, art. 223(d).
99 El Salvador Labor Code, supra note 60, arts. 36-38.
"' Mexico Constitution, supra note 60, art. 123(A)(XXII).
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must be reinstated within twenty-four hours and paid for the time they were
denied work and the employer must be fined. °' Under Mexican law, a
wrongfully dismissed worker may choose either to force the employer to honor
the employment contract by reinstating the worker or pay the worker three
months salary.0 2 Instead of reinstatement, El Salvador requires employers to
give severance pay equal to thirty days salary at minimum wage for every year
worked.° 3
4. Statutory Analysis
Overall, El Salvador's law appears weakest in its protection of the right to
organize. Salvadoran law lacks critical worker safeguards contained in
Guatemalan and Mexican law, such as mandatory worker reinstatement
provisions and limitations on refusing union registration. At the same time, El
Salvador's law burdens workers with additional requirements that Mexican
and Guatemalans do not have to face, such as restrictions on union activity and
financial transactions. Especially problematic obstacles to unionization in
Salvadoran law include a lack of any specific protection against arbitrary
refusal of a union's application, a cumbersome authorization process prior to
union registration, and high membership requirement numbers. By erecting
multiple levels of bureaucracy in the path of union recognition, the law
discourages worker organization and allows a government that is hostile to
worker's rights to legally block union formation. Even worse, El Salvador's
lack of any mandatory reinstatement provisions renders the other protections
practically meaningless since it allows employers to act illegally with
impunity. Severance payment is little consolation in a poor country wherejobs
are hard to find. Additionally, El Salvador's suspension provisions may be
used as a pretext to penalize workers for union activity, and no provision is
made for industry-wide unions.
In contrast, Guatemala's law seems the most protective of unionization
rights and imposes the fewest intrusions into union governance. Guatemalan
law includes protections found in El Salvador's law (such as trade union
immunity) and Mexico's law (prohibitions on arbitrary refusal of union
recognition), while avoiding many of the weaknesses of other areas of those
countries' laws. Guatemala places no significant restrictions on public

0' Guatemala Labor Code, supra note 60, arts. 209, 380.
Mexico Constitution, supra note 60, art. 123(A)(XXII).
.03El Salvador Labor Code, supra note 60, art. 58.
102
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employees' right to unionize, unlike Mexico and El Salvador, which deny or
substantially restrict this right for public employees.
Mexican law does contain the lowest threshold requirements for the
creation of industry-wide unions of any of the three countries. This
theoretically should mean greater bargaining power for union members. Also,
Mexican law is in many ways broader than Salvadoran and Guatemalan law,
especially in the area of employer retaliation for union activity. Instead of
specifically defined immunity, Mexican law provides broad prohibitions on
firing workers for union activity. Whether this makes a difference in practice
will be determined by an examination of the rule of law situation.
B. Right to Collective Bargaining
The laws of all three countries establish an employer's obligation, upon the
union's request, to negotiate collective bargaining agreements with a union
whose members he employs."° El Salvador and Guatemala place limitations
on the employer's obligation to negotiate. In El Salvador, employers are only
obligated to negotiate with unions whose membership represents at least 51%
of the workforce of the business, although two or more unions may join
together to fulfill this requirement. 5 In Guatemala, a union may force
0 6
negotiation if it contains more than a quarter of the workers in the business.
If there is more than one union with the requisite percentage, the employer
must negotiate with whichever one has the most workers directly affected by
the negotiation. 7
Mexico's law contains very specific provisions dealing with collective
contracts. The terms of a collective contract (1) must not result in less
favorable worker conditions than are presently in effect;0 . (2) apply to all
workers in the business, regardless of union membership;0 9 and (3) must

1o Mexico Labor Law, supra note 60, art. 387; Guatemala Labor Code, supra note 60,
art. 51; El Salvador Labor Code, supra note 60, art. 271.
105Conversely, unions with the requisite percentage are also obligated to negotiate with the
employer when requested. El Salvador Labor Code, supra note 60, art. 271.
106 Guatemala Labor Code, supra note 60, art. 51.
107 Id. art. 51(b).
Mexican law similarly states that where there is more than one union,
collective bargaining must take place with the union containing the most members within the
business. Mexico Labor Law, supra note 60, art. 388(I).
0' Mexico Labor Law, supra note 60, art. 394.
109 Id. art. 396.
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remain unaffected by a change in management of the business."' Mexican
labor law also lays out what subjects must be included in collective
agreements-including vacations, salary, hours of work, duration of the
agreement, and whatever other provisions the parties wish to include."'
Collective agreements in Mexico are subject to renegotiation at least every two
years, except that salary provisions are revisable every year; if there is no
request for renegotiation, the contract is automatically renewed for a period
equal to its original duration." 2 Collective contracts in Guatemala must be in
force for at least one year." 3 Employers who fail to comply with the terms of
a collective agreement are subject to fines in Guatemala and El Salvador."'
Noncompliance justifies a worker's strike in all three countries." 5
Analyzing these statutes, it appears that overall, Mexico's right to collective
bargaining appears to provide the most worker protection. Since Mexican law
places no numerical or percentage requirements on unions in order to force
negotiation, its unionized workers have stronger bargaining power than those
of Guatemala and El Salvador. This power is further strengthened by the fact
that the agreements may not weaken current terms, may not be taken away by
a change in management, and apply equally to non-unionized workers.
C. Right to Strike
All three countries recognize a general right to strike," 6 but each places
different restrictions on this right, both in terms of who may exercise it and
how they may do so. Mexican workers have the right to strike when their
rights are violated in a "general and systematic manner.'' All three countries
allow strikes only when a majority of the workers of a certain business
participate, ' and Guatemala specifically states that employer's representatives
110Id. art. 402.
I Id. art. 391.
112 Id. arts. 399, 399 Bis, 400.
13 Guatemala Labor Code, supra note 60, art. 386.
"14 Id. art. 406; El Salvador Labor Code, supra note 60,
art. 476.
.. Mexico Labor Law, supranote 60, art. 387. In Guatemala and El Salvador, this right may
only be exercised after an arbitration process. Guatemala Labor Code, supra note 60, arts. 51,
406; El Salvador Labor Code, supranote 60, art. 480.
..
6 Mexico Constitution, supra note 60, art. 123(A)(XVIII), (B)(X); El Salvador Labor Code,
supra note 60, art. 528; Guatemala Labor Code, supra note 60, art. 242.
"1 Mexico Constitution, supra note 60, art. 123(B)(X).
116 Mexico Labor Code, supra note 60, art. 451(11); Guatemala Labor Code, supra note 60,
art. 241(c); El Salvador Labor Code, supra note 60, art. 553(0. Additionally, El Salvador

2007]

READY OR NOT, HERE COMES DR-CAFTA

are not to be included in the workforce for purposes of determining
percentages."' Additionally, Guatemala and El Salvador require that workers
20
exhaust the mediation/reconciliation process before declaring a strike.
Restrictions are placed on what kind of workers may strike in all three
countries. Guatemala prohibits various groups from striking: transport workers
in route; medical and public sanitation workers; workers in businesses that
provide energy, lighting, telecommunications, and water, if a strike would
cause "grave and immediate harm to the public health, security, and economy";
and state security forces.' 2' The president may also suspend any strike that he
determines would "gravely affect the activities and essential public services of
the country.' 22 El Salvador prohibits strikes by all municipal and public
workers and those that work in "essential services.' 23 Mexico only prohibits
24
wartime strikes of workers in services upon which the government depends.1
Under Mexican law, transportation and public health workers may strike,
subject to limitations. Transportation workers must first continue to their final
destination, and workers in public health must continue attending to those
patients who were in the establishment at the time
the strike was declared until
25
the patients may be moved to another place.
In Mexico, workers in public services must give ten days notice of their
intention to strike. 126 Salvadoran workers 127 must notify the Ministry of Labor
(MOL) and then delay the strike until four days after the MOL informs the
employer. 28 El Salvador and Mexico specifically note that strikes must be

requires that the striking workers represent at least 30% of the "workers affected by the conflict."
Id. art. 529.
19 Guatemala Labor Code, supra note 60, art. 24 1(c).
120 Id. art. 241(b); El Salvador Labor Code, supra note 60, art. 553(c).
12 Guatemala Labor Code, supra note 60, art. 243. When there is a strike by these essential
services, a labor tribunal determines an emergency shift of workers necessary to assure minimum
service, which is set between 200/o-30% of the workers in the business. Id.
122 Id.
123

El Salvador Constitution, supranote 60, art. 221; El Salvador Labor Code, supranote 60,

art. 553(a).
124 Mexico Constitution, supra note 60, art. 123(A)(XVIII).
125 Mexico Labor Code, supra note 60, art. 466.
126 Mexico Constitution, supra note 60, art. 123(A)(XVIII).
127 "Salvadoran workers" here only refers to private sector workers, since as noted, public
sector workers may not strike. See supra text accompanying note 123.
128 El Salvador Labor Code, supra note 60, art. 530.
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nonviolent'2 9 and prohibit employers from hiring replacement workers during
a legal strike. 3 '
These provisions reveal that Mexico's law clearly places fewer substantive
and procedural restrictions on the right to strike than the laws of either Central
American country. Both Guatemala and El Salvador exclude large groups of
workers from this right. By doing so, the laws deprive broad segments of the
workforce, including workers in nonessential services, of a potent negotiation
tool. Mexico's law, in contrast, only restricts the right to strike for workers in
a very narrowly defined situation: essential services in wartime. Unlike
Mexico's law, which only imposes a notice requirement, Salvadoran and
Guatemalan laws mandate arbitration procedures prior to striking. Mexican
law also lacks the broad language of Guatemala and El Salvador's laws that
allows government involvement in strikes (even those by private sector
workers). Through presidential power to end strikes in Guatemala, and Labor
Ministry involvement in the notice procedure in El Salvador, the laws of those
countries provide justification for governments to undermine the exercise of
this critical right. Furthermore, Guatemala allows employers to hire
replacement workers, a strike-undermining technique specifically prohibited
by El Salvador and Mexico.
IV. "LA LEY No CUMPLE": THE FAILURE OF THE RULE OF LAW

A. Mexico: Sham Unions As an Obstacle to True Representation
Probably the most serious problem threatening Mexican workers' right of
association is the existence of "protection unions," which do not represent the
interests of the workers.13 ' Since Mexican law allows for exclusion clauses in
private sector collective bargaining agreements,' 32 unions have enormous
power to act as the hiring agents for a company. By creating their own
"official" union, employers can use the exclusion clause to keep out any nonunionized workers. Additionally, since workers may only belong to one union,
any member of an official union who tries to start an independent union can
129

Mexico Constitution, supra note 60, art. 123(A)(XVIII); El Salvador Labor Code, supra

note 60, art. 534.
130 Posthuma, supra note 65, at 107; El Salvador Labor Code, supra note 60, art. 535.
'1 AMERICAN CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL LABOR SOLIDARITY, JUSTICE FOR ALL: THE
STRUGGLE FOR WORKER RIGHTS IN MEXICO 14 (2003), availableat http://www.solidaritycenter.
org/files/SolidarityMexicofinalpdfl 11 703.pdf [hereinafter SOLIDARITY CENTER].
131 See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
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be fired by use of the exclusion/termination clause. This allows employers to
effectively prevent the formation of any independent unions. 13 3 Protection
contracts, which give workers only the minimum required protections, are
often set up before any workers are hired. ' Since the "union" does nothing,
employees do not even realize that they are members until they attempt to form
an independent union and are threatened with the loss of their jobs.'
The
official union, which is paid directly by the employer in place of collecting
dues, acts as a "peacekeeper" for the employer, guaranteeing that the workers
will not cause any problems.' 36 Circulation of blacklists of workers who try
to start unions or negotiate for higher wages and better working conditions is
common and often quite blatant.13 1 It is estimated that up to 90% of all
collective bargaining contracts filed in Mexico are the result of this kind of
"protection contract" system. 3 ' Public sector workers are completely denied
access to independent unions, since only unions that are members of the
139
official government federation are allowed.
The obstacles faced by workers in this kind of situation are exacerbated by
the fact that the tripartite Conciliation and Arbitration Boards (CABs), which
approve union registration and resolve labor disputes, are skewed to favor probusiness interests. 4 The boards are composed of government, business, and
labor representatives. Usually, however, the labor representatives are from
official, pro-business unions. The government also tends to favor official
unions over independent ones in order to attract investors. "' This has resulted
in repeated delays and/or denial of registration for independent unions.'4 2 This
kind of selective enforcement and preferential treatment of pro-business unions

133

SOLIDARITY CENTER, supranote 131, at 14-15.

"' UNITED STATES BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HuMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR (BDHRL),

MEXICO: COUNTRY REPORT ON HuMAN RIGHTS PRACTICEs-2004 § 6(b) (2005), available at
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2004/41767.htm.
"I HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 2005: MEXICO (2005), availableat http://hrw.
org/english/docs/2005/01/13/mexico9873_txt.htm.
' International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU), Mexico: Annual Survey of
Violations of Trade Union Rights (2004), http://www.icftu.org/displaydocument.asp?Index=
991219418&Language.
131In 2002, one prominent employer organization announced plans to publish a blacklist on
the Internet. SOLIDARITY CENTER, supra note 131, at 15.
131 Id. at 14.
139 See supra text accompanying note 70.
140 SOLIDARITY CENTER, supra note 131, at 10, 13.
...Id. at 13.
142 ICFTU, supra note 136.
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is even more pronounced in the low-wage maquiladora
sector, which is
43
governed by state, rather than federal, government. 1
Another tactic used against workers is to deny that the labor law even
applies to them. Since workers who solely provide services are covered by the
civil code instead of the labor law, employers sometimes force employees to
sign documents denying an employment relationship. Employers take
advantage of this loophole in order to deprive workers of their freedom of
association rights, which are protected by the Federal Labor Law. m44
Open union elections are a continuing problem. A tradition of holding open
representation elections means that workers are usually forced to openly
declare their support for the establishment of a particular union. 45 Secret
ballot elections are not mandated by law, and only occur if all parties
agree-something that employers are not likely to do. 146 Intimidation by
employer representatives and fear of reprisal further
restrict workers' right to
47
interests.
their
represents
that
union
a
choose
These problems continue to threaten workers' rights, despite the fact that
both the ILO and the Mexican Supreme Court have ruled that the use of
exclusion clauses and union monopolies are illegal under international and
national law. 148 The law has not been changed to reflect the ILO
recommendations or the Supreme Court's ruling. Instead, the Minister of
Labor and the official unions have proposed labor reform that would weaken
workers' rights even further. 141

143SOLIDARITY CENTER, supra note 131, at 13.
'4 International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU), Reportfor the WTO General
CouncilReview of Trade Policies of Mexico § I (Mar. 20, 2002), available at http://www.icftu.
org/displaydocument.asp?Lndex=991214929&Language=EN [hereinafter Trade Policies of
Mexico].

14' BDHRL, supra note 134, § 6(b).
'4 Trade Policiesof Mexico, supra note 144, § I.
141SOLIDARITY CENTER, supra note 131, at 16.

148These practices occur by law in the public sector and by custom in the private sector. Id.
at 11-13; ICFTU, supra note 136.
"' See Letter from Jos6 Miguel Vivanco, Executive Director, Americas Division, Human
Rights Watch & Carol Pier, Labor Rights and Trade Research, Human Rights Watch, to
Chamber of Deputies, Mexico City, Mexico (Feb. 9,2005), availableat http://hrw.org/english/
docs/2005/02/09/mexico 101 56.htm (describing proposed legislation that would make strikes and
union formation more difficult).
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B. Guatemala: Violence, Reprisals, andJudicial Capitulation
Labor rights exist mainly on paper in Guatemala. Although Guatemala has
ratified all of the relevant ILO conventions and provides for the protection of
the right of association in its laws, there are many reasons why its workers are
not adequately protected. The judicial system is extremely weak and
ineffective, and has even been described as "on the verge of collapse."' 5 °
There exists a near-unanimous international consensus that the courts are
ineffective, poorly trained, subject to delay, and do not enforce their rulings. 5 '
In this kind of situation, the statutory law matters very little.
Violence is a huge problem for union leaders and members. Even after the
signing of the Peace Accords in 1996, unionists continued to be murdered,
continuing even through 2003.152 Even where the attackers are caught,
sentences may be commuted so that no real sentence is received.5 3 Many
trade unionist killings go unsolved because of lack of political will to
prosecute those responsible.'54 No killings of union leaders were reported in
2004, but death threats and intimidation continue to be a problem.'
Some
5 6
unionists have been forced to flee the country because of death threats.
IS0 International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU), Guatemala: Annual Survey
of Violations of Trade Union Rights (2004), http://www.icftu.org/displaydocument.asp?Index
=991219413&Language=EN [hereinafter Guatemala: Annual Survey].

'5 See, e.g.,

UNITED STATES BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR

(BDHRL), GUATEMALA: COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICEs-2004 § 6(a) (2005),
available at http://www.state.gov/g/drlI/rlshrrpt/2004/41762.htm [hereinafter GUATEMALA:
COUNTRY REPORT] ("The weakness of the judicial system as a whole, the severe shortage of
competent judges and staff, a heavy backlog of undecided cases, and failure to enforce
effectively court rulings all contributed to the labor courts' lack of credibility and
effectiveness."); ILRF, supra note 20 ("The labor courts are weak, proceed slowly, and fail to
enforce their rulings .... ); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 2005: GUATEMALA (2005),
available at http://hrw.org/english/docs/2005/01/13/guatem9849_txt.htm ("[The] justice

system.., relies on [personnel] who receive grossly inadequate training and resources. The
courts routinely fail to resolve judicial appeals and motions in an expeditious manner .... );
International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU), Report for the WTO General
Council Review of Trade Policies of Guatemala § I (Jan. 18, 2002), available at http://www.
icftu.org/displaydocument.asp?Index=991214567&Language=EN [hereinafter Trade Policies
of Guatemala] ("[G]laring weaknesses of the justice system.").
52 Trade Policies ofGuatemala, supra note 151, § I; GUATEMALA: COUNTRY REPORT, SUpra
note 151, § 6(a).
153Trade Policies of Guatemala, supra note 151, § I.
'54 Guatemala: Annual Survey, supra note 150.
5 GUATEMALA: COUNTRY REPORT, supra note 15 1.
156 Guatemala: Annual Survey, supra note 150.
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Although much of the violence is committed by powerful clandestine armed
groups with links to organized crime and/or government, excessive use of force
by the police also results in some killings.'57
Even where no violence is threatened, the weakness of the labor courts
means that employers can act with impunity to retaliate for union activity by
firing workers. Between 1994 and 2002 most of the twenty-one Guatemalan
cases reported to the ILO involved union leaders and members who had been
fired, threatened, or intimidated for union activity.'58 Mass illegal firings are
not uncommon. The International Confederation of Free Trade Unions
(ICFTU) reported that, like in previous years, hundreds of workers were fired
for union membership in 2004.159 There were nearly 3000 complaints of
illegal firings in the first half of 2004, a number roughly equal to the same
period in 2003.16° Terminated workers face an uphill battle to be reinstated.
Aside from the intimidation and threats they will likely receive, defensive
dilatory appeals by employers and a barrage oftechnical barriers thrown up by
the courts often result in years of delay.16 ' Several cases of union dismissals
from 1996 and 1997 had still not been resolved by the courts as of the end of
2004.162 Even where reinstatement orders are given, employers routinely
ignore them, receiving no sanctions for noncompliance. 163 In one recent and
particularly egregious case, a farm ignored sixty-seven orders to reinstate
illegally fired workers."6
Like Mexico, Guatemala's maquiladora sector is the site of some of the
worst examples of employee intimidation and repression. Often employers
will close the plant and move elsewhere if a union is started or if collective
bargaining is requested. 165 Although collective bargaining agreements are
scarce among Guatemalan workers in general, they are practically non-existent
among maquiladora workers. 166 Not until 2004 were any collective agreements
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH,

supra note 151.

158Asociaci6n Servicios de Promoci6n Laboral (ASEPROLA), Un Vistazo Por 6 Derechos

LaboralesB6sicos en Guatemala[A Look at Six Basic Labor Rights in Guatemala], at 19 (Nov.
2004), available at http://rights.igc.org/projects/linklabor (follow "Guatemala" link under
"Aseprola's reports on obstacles to compliance with labor law in Central America").
"' Guatemala: Annual Survey, supra note 150.
160 GUATEMALA: COUNTRY REPORT, supra note 151, § 6(a).
161 ASEPROLA, supra note 158, at 20.
162 Guatemala: Annual Survey, supra note 150.
163 GUATEMALA: COUNTRY REPORT, supra note 151, § 6(a).
'6 Trade Policies of Guatemala,supra note
165 Id.

151, § I.

166GUATEMALA: COUNTRY REPORT, supra note 151, § 6(b).
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registered in maquiladoras; currently there are two.' 67 As in Mexico,
Guatemalan official "solidarity" organizations are promoted by management
in order to prevent the formation of true unions. 68
Poorly trained judges and labor inspectors do not know how to handle labor
disputes and/or are biased towards employers.' 69 The Conciliation and
Arbitration Boards (CABs), which assist in negotiating agreements, are
supposed to be permanent, but instead only meet when necessary, resulting in
delay.170 Even when a collective agreement is reached, employers often ignore
it in whole or in part and refuse to reinstate fired workers. 171 Because of the
many obstacles to union formation and collective bargaining, legal strikes are
72
rare. 1
Not surprisingly, the rates of unionization in Guatemala are very low, less
than 3%,173 compared to 15% in Mexico. 174 Protection of Guatemalan
workers' right of association is widely acknowledged as extremely weak and
"totally insufficient."' 175 This systematic disregard for workers' rights and
safety renders Guatemala's statutory commitments largely illusory.
C. El Salvador: CorruptionandFinancialPressure Tactics
Although unionists in El Salvador are not subject to the extremes of
physical violence that endanger workers in Guatemala, other daunting
obstacles impede their free exercise of the right of association. As in
Guatemala, a strong anti-union culture among employers and government
makes any act of association by workers a challenge.176 The labor authorities
routinely use extremely narrow interpretations of the law to deny union
applications on technical grounds and fail to give workers legally mandated

117Id; Guatemala: Annual Survey, supranote 150.
supra note 151,
169ASEPROLA, supranote 158, at 25-27.
161 GUATEMALA: COUNTRY REPORT,

170 Id.

§ 6(a).

at 28.

Id.; GUATEMALA: COUNTRY REPORT, supra note 151, § 6(a).
172GUATEMALA: COUNTRY REPORT, supra note 151, § 6(b).
171

173 Guatemala:

Annual Survey, supra note 150.

174BDHRL, supra note 134, § 6(a).

Trade Policiesof Guatemala,supra note 151; see also GUATEMALA: COUNTRY REPORT,
supranote 151; ASEPROLA, supra note 158, at 17-28.
176Asociaci6n Servicios de Promoci6n Laboral (ASEPROLA), Un Vistazo Por 6 Derechos
Laborales B6sicos en El Salvador [A Look at Six Basic Labor Rights in El Salvador], at 23
(Nov. 2004), available at http://hights.igc.org/projects/linklabor (follow "El Salvador" link
under "Aseprola's reports on obstacles to compliance with labor law in Central America").
17'
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periods of time to correct errors.' 77 Although legally employers are prohibited
from discriminating among current employees based on union activity, there
is no express prohibition on the common practice of using blacklists to refuse
employment to job applicants who are union organizers.'
Workers who attempt to start a union or request collective bargaining are
subject to myriad types of pressure tactics. Although the law prohibits firing
workers because of union activity,'79 there are many reasons why employers
face no real consequence for doing so. First, there are too few labor inspectors
to respond to all complaints: thirty-seven inspectors serve a population of 2.6
million, according to a 2003 Human Rights Watch report."' Reports of
corruption and ineffectiveness among inspectors are widespread.'' Often
inspectors responding to complaints do not even speak to workers, relying
instead on flawed employer documentation. 8 2 The labor authorities, instead
of protecting workers, often acquiesce to employers' illegal actions by
neglecting to issue rulings, refusing to apply or enforce sanctions, or
complying with employer requests related to pressure tactics (e.g., withholding
salaries).' Since Salvadoran law does not mandate reinstatement of illegally
terminated workers, employers regularly dispose of union members and/or
leaders by firing them and paying the minimum severance package. Such
payments are viewed as a normal cost of doing business, cheaper than
responding to worker demands.'

1' International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU), Internationally-Recognised
CoreLabourStandardsin El Salvador: Reportfor the WTO GeneralCouncil Review of Trade
Policies of El Salvador § I (Feb. 5, 2003), availableat http://www.icftu.org/displaydocument.
asp?Index=9 91217133&Language=EN [hereinafter Trade Policies of El Salvador].
118 HuMAN RIGHTS WATCH, DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE: EL SALVADOR'S FAILURE TO
PROTECT WORKERS' RIGHTS 12 (2003), available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2003/el
salvador 1203/elsalvador 1203.pdf [hereinafter DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE].
179See supra text accompanying notes 64, 92, 94-97, 99.
so DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE, supra note 178, at 2.
"8' UNITED STATES BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR (BDHRL), EL
§ 6(b) (2005), availableat
[hereinafter EL SALVADOR: COUNTRY

SALVADOR: COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES-2004

http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2004/41760.htm
REPORT].

182 DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE, supra note 178, at 18; International Confederation of Free
Trade Unions (ICFTU), El Salvador: Annual Survey of Violations ofTrade Union Rights (2004),
http://www.icftu.org/displaydocument.asp?Index=991219417&Language=EN [hereinafter El
Salvador: Annual Survey].
'3 DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE, supra note 178, at 22-24.
184 Id. at 11-12.
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Employers regularly use legal loopholes to intimidate and punish unionists.
Legally, immunity provisions prevent employers from firing union leaders,"8 5
but that just means that they must continue to pay the workers-not provide
them work. By barring union leaders from the business while continuing to
pay their salary, employers can effectively block union activities.186 Again,
this is just a cost of doing business.
Another tactic is destroying unions through coerced resignations, thereby
bringing the union below the minimum number of members. One way of
achieving this is unpaid suspensions, which can be invoked without any
judicial authorization and may last up to nine months.' 87 Under the pretext of
one of the statutory justifications for suspension, employers suspend unionists
to coerce them into resigning and accepting a severance package.' 88 Employers
also sometimes withhold pay or offer severance packages in order to force
union members and organizers to resign.189 Although death threats are not as
common in El Salvador as in Guatemala, they do occur. 90 In 2004, a union
organizer was murdered, and subsequently the offices of an organization that
called for an investigation of his death were ransacked. ''
Workers who find the administrative labor inspectors unhelpful in terms of
securing rights have recourse in the labor and appeals courts. However, the
average time to hear a case and exhaust all appeals is a year and a half. 9 2 In
this poor country, very few workers can wait that long to reclaim their jobs.'9 3
Rates of unionization are low, around 5%according to human rights groups,'9 4
although the Salvadoran Ministry of Labor reports higher numbers. 9 '

"' See supra notes 92-100 and accompanying text.
.86DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE, supra note 178, at 11-12.
187 EL SALVADOR: COUNTRY REPORT, supra note 181, § 6(a); see also supra note 94 and

accompanying text.
188El Salvador: Annual Survey, supranote 182; DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE, supranote 178,
at 14-15.
'89 DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE, supra note 178, at 14-15.
'90 El Salvador: Annual Survey, supra note 182.
'9' INTERNATIONAL LABOR RIGHTS FUND (ILRF), PETITION TO REVIEW EL SALVADOR'S
COUNTRY EUGIBILITY UNDER THE GENERALIZED SYSTEM OF PREFERENCES (GSP) FOR VIOLATION

OF INTERNATIONALLY RECOGNIZED WORKERS' RIGHTS 5 (2004), available at http://www.

laborrights.org/projects/linklabor/GSP%20E%20Salvador/2012-04.pdf.
192 DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE, supra note 178, at 17.
193 Id.
194 Id.

at 2 (stating that about 5.3% of workers are unionized); El Salvador: Annual Survey,

supra note 182 (stating that unionization is "about five percent").
'95 EL SALVADOR: COUNTRY REPORT, supra note 181, § 6(a) (citing Ministry of Labor
statistics that 30% of workers are unionized).
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Collective bargaining is mediated by the Ministry of Labor, which is often
accused of being biased against labor in favor of large businesses.'
Collective bargaining agreements are nonexistent in the maquiladoras/export
processing zones (EPZs), where anti-union discrimination and intimidation is
especially bad.'9 7 An August 2000 report by the newly formed and U.S.
funded Monitoring Unit of El Salvador's own Labor Ministry, which was
immediately retracted and denied because of EPZ companies' reaction, noted
that any maquiladora workers who attempted to organize themselves were
threatened with dismissal.' In one high profile case, a company closed its El
Salvador maquiladora after its unionized workers won a hard fought court
battle for recognition and applied for negotiation of a collective agreement. 199
Workers who strike or otherwise protest business policies may be subjected
to dismissal and other pressure tactics. Many of the illegal firings reported in
recent years have been in the context of worker protests over privatization of
formerly public industries such as hospitals and airports.2 °° In 2002, striking
health workers received death threats, workers were fired, and the government
used bribes and military raids on hospitals to attempt to break the strike.
However, after a nine-month strike, workers who had been fired because of the
strike finally were reinstated and received part of their salaries for the
period.2"'
V. DR-CAFTA: EMPTY PROMISES FOR WORKERS' RIGHTS

Guatemala and El Salvador's protection of labor rights is grossly
inadequate. Although Mexico's labor climate is far from perfect, its laws and
enforcement are generally stronger than those of the two Central American
nations. This is important to note because, as will be discussed, the NAALC
has done little more than maintain the status quo in Mexico. At best, a
NAALC-like agreement, such as the DR-CAFTA, is likely to leave the current
situation in El Salvador and Guatemala unimproved. More likely, the DRCAFTA will grant trade access to Central American governments which, in the
absence of meaningful enforcement, have every incentive to further repress
196Id. § 6(b).
197 Trade Policies of El Salvador, supra note

177.

'9' DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE, supra note 178, at
199 El Salvador: Annual Survey, supra note 182.
200

86-87.

Trade Policies of El Salvador,supra note 177; DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE, supra note

178, at 3.
201 Trade Policies of El Salvador, supra note 177.
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labor in order to compete with other low wage markets for highly coveted
foreign investment.
A. Comparison of the OverallLabor Situation
Guatemala's laws on the right to organize are at least on par with, and
possibly stronger than, Mexico's laws; El Salvador's are the weakest of the
three. However, Guatemala's statutory protections are nullified by a
completely ineffective court system and pervasive violence and intimidation.
El Salvador suffers from many of the same structural problems as Guatemala,
such as ineffective courts, and while violence is less of a problem, the statutory
law is so full of flaws that employers usually do not have to resort to extralegal
coercion to get rid of unionists. The various ways in which employers dispose
of troublesome unionists in the three countries are illustrative. In Mexico
employers use exclusion clauses-a legal loophole-to prevent the formation
of independent unions and terminate workers who want to start a union.2" 2 El
Salvador and Guatemala prohibit exclusion clauses. Instead, in Guatemala,
death threats and the prospect of prolonged court struggles are used against
workers who demand their rights;2 3 Salvadoran employers either use long
suspensions combined with economic pressure,2 or illegally fire workers and
pay minimal severance packages.20 5 Trade union immunity and expansive
statutory language protecting unions are meaningless in El Salvador, where
employers only pay a small fee for breaking the law, and in Guatemala, where
the courts refuse to enforce the law.
In the area of collective bargaining, Mexico's laws are more workerfriendly than those of either Guatemala or El Salvador. Mexican law does not
impose the numerical requirements that Guatemala and El Salvador do. In
these Central American countries with very low rates of unionization, no doubt
due to the tremendous obstacles organizers face, meeting the requisite
percentages needed for collective bargaining is difficult. In El Salvador
especially, a requirement that unions contain at least 5 1% of the workforce in
order to force negotiation20 6 makes collective bargaining unlikely in a country
where unionization is around 5%.2"7 Although many Mexican workers are
202 See supranotes 65, 133-36 and accompanying text.
203

See supratext accompanying notes 152-57, 161-63.

204 See supratext accompanying notes 188-89.
205

206
207

See supratext accompanying note 184.
See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
See supra note 194 and accompanying text.
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covered by "protection contracts," which are not negotiated by independent
unions, 20 workers at least have some kind of written, enforceable contract.
The vast majority of workers in El Salvador and Guatemala are not covered by
collective contracts 2 9 and have very little or no power to negotiate with the
management.
Mexican law also places fewer restrictions on which employees can strike,
and in practice strikes are more common in Mexico than in Guatemala.1 0
Comparatively high percentages of the workforce-public employees and
essential and non-essential service workers-in the Central American countries
are denied a right available to the majority of Mexican workers. Striking
workers in Mexico are less likely to face violent resistance by the government
or private security forces and are less likely to lose their jobs.
Complaints of delay and pro-government/big business bias are a recurring
theme describing the labor court systems of all three countries. However, the
Mexican Supreme Court has at least shown some willingness to stand up for
workers' rights.2"' Although the Mexican courts do have some problems, there
have not been reports of court acquiescence in illegal forced resignations (as
in El Salvador),212 cases that drag on for years (Guatemala), or persistent
13
flagrant refusals to obey court orders (Guatemala).
The most pressing labor problem in Mexico seems to be denial of
registration to independent unions through the use of official unions, biased
labor boards, and intimidation and dismissals.2 4 While these are serious
problems, they pale in comparison to the mass illegal dismissals, the death
208

See supra text accompanying note 138.

209 GUATEMALA: COUNTRY REPORT, supra note 151.
210 Compare BDHRL, supra note 134, § 6(b) (reporting

that there were twenty-three strikes

in Mexico during 2004), with GUATEMALA: COUNTRY REPORT, supra note 151, § 6(b) ("[T]he
very low level of unionization and procedural hurdles made legal strikes rare [in Guatemala].").
21 See supra text accompanying note 148.
212 See supra text accompanying note 183.
213 See supra text accompanying notes 161-62, 164.
214 See, e.g., INDEPENDENT ADVISORY REPORT, supranote 52, § Ill(B) (summarizing various
submissions to the U.S. NAO: No. 940003-arbitrary refusal by the government to register an
independent union and harassment and intimidation of the union's members; No.
960 1-cancellation of the registration of an independent union and government bias towards the
official union; No. 9602-intimidation and terminations of unionists along with creation of a
"protection union"; No. 9702-dismissals, threats, and physical beatings of independent union
members). For more recent submissions dealing with this recurring theme, see U.S. Dep't of
Labor, Status of Submissions Under the North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation, U.S.
NAO No. 2005-02, 2005-03, http://www.dol.gov/ILAB/programs/nao/status.htm#iial6 (last
visited Mar. 22, 2007).
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threats and assassinations, and the courts' complete abdication of their
responsibilities to protect workers in El Salvador and Guatemala.
Unlike Mexico, Guatemala and El Salvador continue to bear the marks of
brutal civil wars, where military regimes ruled with impunity and where
dissension, including labor activism, was crushed. 2 5 This deeply ingrained
way of dealing with organized labor continues to affect the rule of law.
Heavy-handed management is still the norm, whether it is achieved through
violence, twisted laws and meaningless courts, government acquiescence, or
a combination of all of these. Consequently, rates of unionization are much
lower in these countries than in Mexico. 1 6
B. Like the NAALC, DR-CAFTA Is an Ineffective Tool for Enforcement of
Rights
Studying the current labor situation of El Salvador and Guatemala is
important because, like Mexico under the NAALC, the DR-CAFTA is unlikely
to make any real difference in the protection of worker rights. There are
several reasons for this. First, in general, countries are not chosen for U.S.
FTAs because of their outstanding, or even acceptable, human rights regimes.
Obviously, trade is the priority; so, countries are chosen based on their
geographic location, relationship to the United States, and the size of their
economies." 7 Rather than trade access being granted as a reward to acceptable
treatment of workers, negotiation of FTAs is usually driven by the potential
21'

GUATEMALA: COUNTRY REPORT, supra note 151, § 6(a) ("[T]he legacy of violent

repression of labor activists during the internal conflict [in Guatemala] . . . constrained the
exercise of worker rights."). Peace accords ending long and bloody civil wars were signed in
El Salvador in 1992 and Guatemala in 1996. U.S. Dep't of State, Background Note: El
Salvador, http://www.state.gov/r/ pa/ei/bgn/2033.htm#history (last visited Mar. 22,2007); U.S.
Dep'tof State, Background Note: Guatemala, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2045.htm#history
(last visited Mar. 22, 2007).
216 CompareBDHRL, supranote 134, § 6(a) (placing the rate of unionization in Mexico at
approximately 15%), with GUATEMALA: COUNTRY REPORT, supra note 151, § 6(a) (placing the
rate of unionization in Guatemala at less than 3%), and El Salvador: Annual Survey, supranote
182 (placing the rate of unionization in El Salvador at around 5%).
217 See Jerome Levinson, Certifying International Worker Rights: A PracticalAlternative,
20 COMp. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 401, 406 (1999); see also Office of the United States Trade
Representative, CAFTA Facts:Free Trade with CentralAmericaand the DominicanRepublic Highlightsof the CAFTA (Feb. 2005), http://www.ustr.gov/assets/TradeAgreements/Bilateral/
CAFTA/BriefingBook/assetupload file 152_7179.pdf ("With U.S. exports of more than $15
billion in 2003, Central America and the Dominican Republic make up the second-largest market
for U.S. exports in Latin America.").
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benefits to foreign investors of low-cost labor.2"' Once trade privileges are
granted, they are extremely difficult to revoke.219 This is because governments
have little incentive to pursue real changes in labor regimes. Pushing for
enforcement of, and sanctions for noncompliance with, labor laws is usually
not politically acceptable, as governments do not want to strain diplomatic
relationships fostered through FTAs.220 This explains why under the NAALC,
even complaints on topics which may advance to higher levels, such as
" ' On the other
occupational safety, have gone nowhere.22
hand, governments
of developing countries have every incentive to repress labor and keep costs
low in order to retain valuable foreign investment.222 For countries such as El
Salvador and Guatemala, which already freely trample workers' rights, the
increased foreign investment of FTAs will likely lead to increased efforts to
maintain a cheap, submissive workforce.
Undoubtedly, impoverished Central American countries need to attract
foreign investment in order to prosper, and trade with the United States
represents an opportunity to tap into a huge source of capital. 223 Free trade
agreements can be a powerful force for bringing these countries into the
international market, with resultant economic gains. However, foreign
investment can be a curse for workers if not constrained by some measure of
respect for labor rights. In recent years, the reality of a massive, low-wage

211 Juan Carlos Linares, The Development Dilemma: Reconciling U.S. Foreign Direct
Investment in Latin America with Laborers'Rights: A Study of Mexico, the DominicanRepublic

and Costa Rica, 29 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 249, 251-52 (2003).
219 Levinson,
220

supra note 217, at 406.

See, e.g., U.S. ADVISORY REPORT, supra note 44, Annex 3, § V(C) ("Governments will

have diplomatic disincentives against initiating [investigations into labor violations] against
other Parties [to FTAs, specifically NAALC in this case]...."); see also John P. Isa, Testing the
NAALC's DisputeResolution System: A Case Study, 7 AM. U.J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 179,
213 (1999).
221 Recent submissions have not received any more substantial treatment than earlier ones.
See, e.g., Public Communications, supra note 53 (summarizing content and action taken on
submissions to US NAO: No. 2000-01-failure of the Mexican government to regulate ongoing
unsafe and hazardous working conditions, formation of bilateral working group of experts to
formulate technical recommendations; 2003-01-freedom of association complaints, biased
labor boards, Ministerial consultations).
222 See Isa, supra note 220, at 196 ("[C]onsiderable incentive has grown for poor
countries
to surrender their commitment to their own regulatory objectives-including ideals of industrial
labor relations-to the anti-regulatory demands of potential foreign investors.").
223 See, e.g., DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE, supra note 178, at 82-84 (stating that U.S.

companies own 34% of the factories in El Salvador's free trade zones, more than nationals of
any other country).
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workforce in China and other Asian countries has put enormous pressure on
Latin American countries to retain dwindling foreign investment. 224 This
results in a "race to the bottom" that hurts already struggling workers. Without
provisions ensuring enforcement of adequate labor standards, FTAs enrich a
limited number of business owners and investors at an enormous cost to poor
workers.
The NAALC is a classic example of an FTA that, while bolstering trade
and promising to support labor rights, has done almost nothing to "improve
working conditions" or "promote compliance with, and effective enforcement"
of Mexico's labor law. 225 The DR-CAFTA promises to be more of the same.
Although the DR-CAFTA is technically an improvement over the NAALC, in
that freedom of association violations are not barred from dispute resolution
procedures, this is unlikely to make much difference in practice. As discussed
previously, the political will to enforce labor protections in FTAs is lacking on
both sides. Like the NAALC, the DR-CAFTA is unlikely to do more for
workers' rights than generate reports and conferences. If labor conditions were
truly a concern, the United States could have insisted on an agreement more
akin to the textile treaty with Cambodia, under which Cambodia is granted
increased access to U.S. markets conditioned on improvement of working
conditions.226 In reality, neither the United States, nor the Salvadoran or
Guatemalan governments are likely to insist on dramatic changes in the way
that the labor laws are enforced. The U.S. trade authorities have attempted to
understate and downplay the issue of labor violations in the DR-CAFTA
countries, 2 2 despite widely available evidence of the seriousness of the

224 Linares, supra note 218, at 285-86.
225 NAALC, supra note 33, arts. 1(1), (6).
226

ABRAMI, supra note 18, at 1-2.

227 See Office of the United States Trade Representative, CAFTA Facts: The Case for

CAFTA-Growth, Opportunity,and Democracyin OurNeighborhood(Feb. 2005), http://www.
ustr.gov/assets/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/CAFTA/BriefingBook/assetupload_
file235_7178.pdf ("[E]nforcement of labor laws in the region needs more attention and
resources.") ("Elected leaders in the region are embracing freedom and economic reform,
... (emphasis in
fighting corruption, strengthening the rule of law and battling crime.
original)).
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situation."8
political
maneuvering
prior to DR-CAFTA's
ratification
not going to This
suddenly
change
once the agreement
has entered into
force. is
VI. CONCLUSION

The state of workers' right of association in El Salvador and Guatemala
suffers from many of the weaknesses of Mexico's situation. However, El
Salvador, in particular, has much weaker laws than Mexico. Major problems
of ineffective courts, impunity, and violence in both of the Central American
countries make the violation of labor rights significantly more serious in those
nations than in Mexico. However, the DR-CAFTA applies the same weak,
largely exhortatory provisions to Central America as the NAALC applies to
Mexico. While the NAALC did little to help workers' situations in Mexico,
the DR-CAFTA will maintain or even exacerbate a worse labor climate in El
Salvador and Guatemala. Without strong enforcement of labor provisions, the
DR-CAFTA will only hasten the "race to the bottom" in Latin America, with
disastrous results for Central American workers.

228 Numerous human rights and development groups have expressed concern at the state of

labor affairs in the DR-CAFTA countries. See, e.g., Sandra Polaski & Viji Rangaswami,
CAFTA-DR: No Pride in a Teaspoon of Sugar a Week, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR

May 12, 2005, available at http://www.carnegieendowment.org/
publications/index.cfin?fa=print&id=16924 (noting that Central America suffers from a host of
widely documented labor problems); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, CAFTA's WEAK LABOR RIGHTS
INTERNATIONAL PEACE,

PROTECTIONS: WHY THE PRESENT ACCORD SHOULD BE OPPOSED 2 (2004), availableat http://

hrw.org/english/docs/2004/03/09/cafta90days.pdf ("[C]urrent labor laws and practices in the
region give serious reason for concern."); International Labor Rights Fund, Testimony Regarding
the Central American Free Trade Agreement (Apr. 12, 2005), available at http://www.laborri
ghts.org/publications/CAFTA%20Testimony/2OApril%202005.pdf (noting the continuing
systemic failures of the labor law in the DR-CAFTA countries).

